Abstract
Introduction
Islamic law is believed by Muslim scholars to be the most flexible heavenly revealed law when compared with the other revealed laws in their original versions. Thanks to this flexibility, Islamic law can accommodate all genuine and useful needs of the market. Elements of flexibility of Islamic financial law include: Permissibility, as the de-facto original position in Sharī'ah; and Dynamism, as Sharī'ah rules being not all fixed or permanent for they include the Mutaghiyyrat (changeable); and the prohibitions in Sharī'ah, for not being all of the same degree. Equipped with a flexible basis for legislation, the faqih (Muslim jurist) is provided with general guidelines that help him reach sound and acceptable rulings. These guidelines teach the faqih to observe while judging or developing a transaction: the structure of the transaction, the essence of the transaction, the general as well as the particular Sharī'ah objectives of the transaction and the implications of implementing the transaction. Sharī'ah also teaches the faqih to prioritize these requirements when compromising some is necessary. Well-established Sharī'ah concepts, however, like Sharī'ah policy, public interest and necessity have been used in the modern Fiqh (Islamic law), especially in Islamic finance, to reprioritize these requirements and sometimes to unjustifiably sacrifice some. Although these concepts are Sharī'ah concepts and some are originally valid Ijtihād instruments, applying them in the context of Islamic finance has raised major Sharī'ah concerns. The following discussion outlines some of the valid Ijtihād instruments for Islamic finance, and then it elaborates on the instruments effectively in use and their Sharī'ah concerns.
The Proper Ijtihād Instruments in Islamic Finance
Sharī'ah equips Sharī'ah scholars conducting Ijtihād with multiple Ijtihād instruments that would help them structure and endorse products. The following are the most vital Ijtihād instruments at the disposal of the Mujtahid in the field of Islamic financial law. 
Sharī'ah texts and their interpretations
Sharī'ah texts refer to the Quran and the Sunnah. In the area of financial transactions Sharī'ah texts provide general rules and rarely provide details. This is because the nature of the financial transactions changes as they may get more sophisticated over time. Therefore, it would not be convenient to provide details on the inherently changeable contracts, because these details would not be possibly relevant then to the modern applications of these contracts. The general rules provided by the Sharī'ah texts, however, are sufficient for Muslim jurists to deduce Sharī'ah rules for the modern transactions. When attempting Ijtihād, however, Muslim jurists may find that the same Sharī'ah text pertaining to a financial transaction may be interpreted in multiple valid ways. In fact, this applies to most legal Sharī'ah texts, and it explains the reasons why within the boundaries of Sharī'ah existed different schools of Fiqh. Contemporary Sharī'ah scholars do not need to restrict their fatwas (legal opinions) to one particular valid interpretation advocated by a particular Fiqh school, or even stay within the interpretations made by the classic schools of Fiqh, as long as the interpretation they may opt for, or develop on their own, is meeting the basic requirements of validity. That is, the interpretation is not in conflict with the established Sharī'ah rules and principles, and the Arabic language admits this interpretation within the context of the text. 
Permissibility being the original ruling in Sharī'ah
One of the well-established Fiqh maxims is "permissibility is the original norm in Sharī'ah". Accordingly, all matters are deemed permissible in the absence of prohibiting texts.
3 This, in fact, constitutes a vital tool for the Sharī'ah scholars to endorse new Islamic banking and finance products and transactions. Any new structured products or transaction will be deemed as permissible as long as it is free from the prohibited elements like interest, gharar (uncertainty) or Ghabn (fraud).
Prohibition being of different categories and degrees
Prohibition in the Sharī'ah is not of the same category especially in the field of financial transactions, for there exist in Sharī'ah the so-called haram lizatihi (unlawful in itself) and haram lighairihi (unlawful in consideration of something else). The first prohibition is applicable to cases where the evil is embedded in the very act, like in Ribā where charging interest is an evil in itself, or in gambling where it involves unjustified seizure of others' properties. The second prohibition relates to acts that are originally lawful but made unlawful owing to the presence of certain conditions, like sale contract when concluded during Jum'a (Friday) prayer. 4 Although sale contract is originally halal (lawful) by virtue of some textual evidences, it is deemed haram (unlawful) if concluded during Jum'a prayer since engaging with sale, or any other transaction/activity , may lead to the evil of missing the Jum'a prayer. In other words, the haram lighairihi is unlawful in view of its results and implications.
5 Being so, there is an avenue for acts under this category of prohibition not to be regarded unlawful if they can be construed as nonleading to the perceived cautions. This means, based on the rationale and reason of this prohibition, that if care is exercised for the act not to be conducive to the feared evil, then the act may be regarded as lawful. This in fact adds to the flexibility to Islamic law and functions as a relaxing instrument particularly within the framework of Islamic financial contracts.
However, it remains the responsibility of Sharī'ah scholars to identity the unlawful acts that can fall under this category of prohibition. This is in order to look into the possibility of excluding them by laying the appropriate conditions that will liberate these acts from their evil-producing nature. In this regard, it can be said that the very prohibition of gharar (uncertainty) is declared by some esteemed old Sharī'ah scholars not to be meant for itself, but in conjunction with its possible evil implications (tahreem dharai'i-prohibition in view of evil implications) like the dispute it may lead to between the parties to the contract. 6 This means that gharar is prohibited only when evils are expected; if, however, no evil or harm to be expected, then the contracts involving gharar may be deemed as lawful. This stand may be supported by the existence of many exceptions Sharī'ah made to gharar prohibition, like in validating gharar-bearing contracts like Salam and Istiṣnā' 7 , and also in tolerating the minor gharar in all sorts of contracts.
Analogy (Qiyās)
Analogy is very instrumental for Ijtihād, it relates to the extension of a Sharī'ah ruling of an old established case to a new case when the latter shares the same effective cause (illah) of the former. Since Sharī'ah texts have stated the rulings of many financial transactions, the jurist (faqih) may make use of these stated rulings by applying the same to the new transactions if they are found to be sharing the same illah. For example, the modern day financial derivatives, when used for hedging, become similar in essence to gambling and games of luck, and therefore they have been ruled by contemporary scholars as unlawful since gambling itself is stated by Sharī'ah texts as unlawful. Thus, qiyās is very vital and useful instrument, and it in fact ensures consistency between Sharī'ah and reason. The challenge however is, to certain extent, in identifying the illah and to larger extent in assessing the similarity of the new case with the old case; a process that jurists have termed as tahqiq al-manat.
Public interests (Maṣlaḥah Mursala)
By definition, Maṣlaḥah Mursala refers to any interest that is deemed to be beneficial to the society and which has no textual evidence on its authority or otherwise. It is a juristic device whose authority has been established based on the fact that all Sharī'ah rules are meant to realize public benefits. Muslim jurists have built on this fact the notion of Maṣlaḥah; deeming as permissible anything that realizes public interest and as invalid or impermissible anything that brings about harm and evil. Among the major Fiqh schools, Maliki School is known to be the leading proponent of maṣlaḥah as one of Ijtihād instruments and sources of Sharī'ah. On the other hand, other Fiqh schools reject it as independent source of Sharī'ah though they practice it, possibly under a different name 10 8 Istihsan, for example, which is adopted by the Hanafi school, leads in some of its applications to the same end result of Maslaha; it endorses Sharī'ah rules based on their inherent benefits. 9 , "A Critical Appraisal of The Challenges of Realizing Maqāṣid AlSharī'ah in Islamic Banking and Finance", P 7, IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, International Islamic University Malaysia, Vol. 15, No 2. 10 The formulation of a rule on the basis of 'al-masalih al-mursalah' must take into account the public interest and conform to the objectives of Sharī'ah. The application of this tool must fulfill three main conditions. First, it only deals with transaction matters (mu'āmalah) where reasoning through rational faculty is deemed to be plausible. Second, the interests should be in harmony with the spirit of Sharī'ah. In other words it must not be in conflict with any of its main sources. Third, the interests should be of essential and necessary (darurah) and not of a luxury type. For more details, see Abozaid, 2006 
Relationship between maṣlaḥah & maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah (Sharī'ah objectives):
Maṣlaḥah directly relates to Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah since the very realization of maṣlaḥah is the primary objective of the Sharī'ah. Protection of religion, life, lineage, intellect and wealth are the five essential values of Sharī'ah, and all Sharī'ah rules revert to these values. Rules of Ibādah (devotions), for example, relate to the protection of religion. Islamic rules of financial transactions, on the other hand, relate to the protection of wealth. Protection of all these essential values is the ultimate maṣlaḥah for human beings and thus, it is the primary Sharī'ah objective.
Blocking the means to evil 11
Among the valid juristic devices that the Mujtahid needs to uphold while attempting Ijtihād on a Sharī'ah issue is Sadd al-dharaiy', which means blocking the means to evil before it materializes. A particular transaction could be lawful in itself but in view of its goal or outcome it may lead to evil and thus, it should be ruled as unlawful. Leasing a real estate property, for example, to a company that will use it as a gambling casino is unlawful though the lease contract in essence is lawful; this is in view of the implication of this lease contract, which is in this context facilitating the evil of gambling. Another application is sale contract when executed in a way that renders it an interest-bearing loan. Selling an asset on credit basis then buying it instantly on the spot for a cash price and in collusion with the buyer is effectively a Ribā contract, whereby the original seller has advanced cash money to the buyer then claimed more from the same, and the asset of sale has been used only as a tool to presumably legalize the exchange of cash ('īnah sale).
In fact, Sadd al-dharaiy' is of a special importance in Islamic finance since it protects it from the invasion of products that have a valid structure but an unlawful essence. It, in other words, helps ensure the identity of Islamic finance being genuinely distinguished from that of the conventional finance.
Thus, Sadd al-dharaiy' is a juristic device that excludes rather than endorses new products, but yet it is an extremely vital tool to ensure the quality of the products being genuinely Sharī'ah complaint and not conducive to the evils of the conventional banking and finance products.
Invalid Ijtihād Instruments & Applications
Despite the valid instruments that the Sharī'ah equips the Mujtahid with when determining the Sharī'ah validity of contracts and transactions as detailed above, the contemporary Ijtihād in Islamic finance has sometimes departed from the proper tools and methodology of Ijtihād by adopting inapplicable instruments, twisting or misusing of applicable ones and by overlooking important instruments. This is detailed in the following discussion.
Use of inapplicable instruments

Sharī'ah Policy (al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyyah)
The term Sharī'ah policy has recently entered the jargon of the fatwas related to Islamic banking and finance. Some products and transactions have in their list of fatwa justifications the term Sharī'ah policy. So, what is Sharī'ah policy and is it a valid instrument for endorsing products and transactions on its basis?
a. Meaning of Sharī'ah Policy
Sharī'ah policy, or al-siyasah al-Shar'iyyah, in its broad sense refers to the area in Islamic Fiqh that explains rulings related to policies and approaches taken in managing and organizing national policies in accordance with the spirit of the Sharī'ah.
12 It covers a whole spectrum of issues in areas like economics, the judiciary, politics and international relations. 13 It is the management of the public and general affairs of the Muslim state in accordance with the public interests and the interest of the Muslim state. Sharī'ah policy involves different principles including striking the balance between what it is dictated by the circumstances and the stated Sharī'ah rules. In other words, it gives the Muslim governor the needed flexibility to occasionally set aside an established Sharī'ah rule in favor of a new rule recognizable by the Sharī'ah if the latter serves the public interest in a better way. It may involve the temporary suspension of some Sharī'ah provisions that relate to Mubahat (permissible things). In other words, it relates to Maṣlaḥah in its macro applications, and in some of its application it relates to the estimation of the general ḍarūrah (necessity) that is capable of rendering the prohibited things permissible or the obligatory things not mandatory.
b. Who is to determine the Sharī'ah policy?
Sharī'ah policy can only be determined by the Muslim government and cannot be left to be determined by individuals including Sharī'ah scholars. This is because it relates to the management of the people and the state's general affairs, which is the responsibility of the Muslim government. Assuming the responsibilities of the Muslim government by independent individuals opens the door to some evils. Naturally, if individuals are empowered to do so, they may produce conflicting policies. It is also possible that they will serve their own interests rather than the public interests.
c. Mishandling of Sharī'ah policy in Islamic finance
Sharī'ah scholars assuming the Muslim government's responsibilities in determining Sharī'ah Policies in Islamic finance
In the absence of Sharī'ah-committed Muslim governments and their roles in drawing up the necessary Sharī'ah policies in Islamic finance to meet the challenges facing this industry, individual Sharī'ah boards and scholars have taken up this responsibility of the Muslim government and engaged themselves in practicing the Sharī'ah policy. However, the danger stems from the fact that realization of the people's interests and the maintenance of Sharī'ah objectives, which are the core of Sharī'ah policy, will have been then placed at risk. This is because Sharī'ah policy is a quite sensitive principle. When Sharī'ah scholars 14 ply Sharī'ah policy, their presumed transparency may be potentially challenged and be influenced by the material gains that they may derive from the rules they determine on the basis of their exercise of the Sharī'ah policy. Obviously, Sharī'ah scholars are not neutral or independent in this regard, but rather beneficiaries of the very rules that they justify on Sharī'ah policy basis. In other words, it is justifiably feared that this very sensitive legal tool called Sharī'ah policy may be misused by the Sharī'ah boards to tolerate unlawful transactions that would please their employers (Islamic banks) under the pretext and the claim that these transactions serve the public interest or the economies of the Muslim countries. Besides, competitions between banks and lack of coordination among Sharī'ah boards will very likely result in having conflicting assessments of the Sharī'ah policy, yielding thus conflicting rules, products and stands on what constitutes a public interest. Eventually, it is the Ummah as a whole that will suffer from this practice and the Sharī'ah policy will lead to what is just the opposite of what it has been designed for.
It is for these two reasons that the Islamic Sharī'ah gives the power of determining Sharī'ah policy to the Muslim government and not to individual bodies or entities. In fact, it is a tool in the hands of politicians, as the name indicates, and not in the hands of anyone else, and the absence of Sharī'ahobservant Muslim government does not give the right to Sharī'ah people to assume responsibilities which cannot be theirs.
Moreover, determining an issue on the basis of Sharī'ah policy is not simple; it is a process that involves observing different considerations such as the degree of urgency, measuring the harms against the benefits expected and the implications on all levels. It may also involve setting a timeframe that needs to be observed and possibly amended in light of the results, implications and the changing circumstances. Therefore, it is not a simple process but rather a one that requires an institution at the top government level. For this reason determining a Sharī'ah policy is a joint governmental work. The Muslim ruler should set Sharī'ah policies after consultation with the Shūrá 15 council which houses trustful and independent consultants of different specialties and backgrounds including the Sharī'ah scholars.
Another important element that relates to the operation of Sharī'ah policy is the enforcement of the policy, for the absence of the enforcement power may lead to opposite results. In the context of Islamic banking and finance, if not all of the financial institutions abide by the rules determined on Sharī'ah policy basis, disorder and chaos will prevail, and these institutions will fail to play their perceived economic role in the society. Thus, even when the Sharī'ah policy is plied right by individuals, lack of enforcement will hinder its success and may turn it into a sheer evil.
However, none of the above is observed when Sharī'ah policy is determined by individual Sharī'ah scholars or Sharī'ah boards, and apart from those conditions of the operation of Sharī'ah policy, lessons of experience have taught us that transparency is not something that can be taken for granted in any person, and Sharī'ah scholars being humans and fallible are not exception. In fact, Sharī'ah dictates that transparency and credibility must be sought in anyone who is to hold an office attending to public affairs and needs, but being a practical and realistic religion, Sharī'ah does not stop at this point. It, in fact, places rules and restrictions on the conduct and the behavior of such a person. A Muslim judge, for example, must be among the most trustworthy persons to be eligible for his position. However, his proved trustworthiness never gives him the right to take fees or accept gifts from the parties attending his court, for this may trigger his instinctively sinful human nature and thus influence his judgment and cause him to deviate from the path of justice. 
The Principle of Ḍarūrah (Necessity)
It is a well-established principle in Islamic law that ḍarūrah, which means necessity, renders the prohibited things permissible. This principle is unanimously agreed upon by all schools of Islamic law, and it constitutes a Fiqh maxim that reads "Necessities permit the forbidden" (Al-Ḍarūrat Tubih Al-Mahzūrat). It means that the forbidden can be un-sinfully committed when necessary. However, when jurists discussed and explained the applications of this Fiqh maxim they mentioned what is known in Arabic as dawābit, which means conditions and guidelines, for the functionality of this maxim. These regulations (dawābit) are stated in or derived from the Sharī'ah texts. One of these guidelines relates to the very concept of ḍarūrah or what really constitutes a ḍarūrah. The jurists' approach to the concept of legal ḍarūrah can be summarized by saying that ḍarūrah is something which is indispensable for the preservation and protection of the five essential values: Religion, Life, Intellect, lineage and Wealth. 17 This means that the concept of ḍarūrah would give the Mukallaf (the Muslim charged with Sharī'ah rules) the legal excuse to commit the forbidden when it becomes indispensable for his survival, spiritually and physically. 18 Therefore, in order for the principle of ḍarūrah to be operative the underlying act must be indispensable for the survival of human being, i.e. it must be a necessity. However, some Fiqh schools have placed at par with necessity what is termed in the Sharī'ah as hajah (need) but only when it is public. The term hajah refers to a human need that is not essential for the survival of human beings, but it is important for their wellbeing. In other words, hajah is what a human can survive without, but only with hardship and difficulties. For example, having a car is not a necessity in Sharī'ah terms, but it could be a public need in some places.
Misapplication of Ḍarūrah
Ḍarūrah has been loosely used in Islamic banking and finance to justify products that would not pass Sharī'ah scrutiny test and would breach basic Sharī'ah rules. The justifying argument predicates on the submission that such products are indispensable for the survival and long-term sustainability of Islamic bank due to certain uncontrollable considerations. Very clearly, this argument presumes that the very concept of banking is a necessity in itself, while in the actual fact banking is not indispensable for the mukallaf's (obligor's) survival from the Sharī'ah perspective, nor is it a public need in Sharī'ah terms. If such ḍarūrah hypothetically exists, then it would rather legitimize dealing with conventional banks directly.
Obviously, when Sharī'ah prohibits something it always provides alternatives. For example when Sharī'ah prohibits zina it permits marriage, when it prohibits wine and pork for consumption it permits all other sorts of food and drinks. Likewise, when Sharī'ah prohibits certain contracts such as contracts based on ribā (interest) and gharar (uncertainty), it alternatively permits many contracts like sale, lease, salam, istiṣnā', mudarabah and musharakah. To economists, such contracts are even better alternatives to ribā and gharar, and ultimately can help develop a prosperous and healthy economy, while an economy that is based on ribā and gharar deepens the disparity between rich and poor, and leads to inequitable and unjust wealth allocation in a given society. Thus, there is no ḍarūrah that may allow Islamic banks to abandon these beneficial contracts in favour of harmful and destructive ones.
Moreover, tolerating a sinful activity on the basis of ḍarūrah never justifies the claim of its original permissibility. Islamic banks have tolerated certain products on the basis of ḍarūrah then offered the same to the public as Sharī'ah compliant products. Obviously, this is a betrayal of Sharī'ah rules and a betrayal of the clients' trust, not to mention the negative effects of such attitude on the image of Sharī'ah if not Islam in general. Promoting as Sharī'ah compliant something that is not so, raises question marks on the rationality of the religion by Muslim and nonMuslims alike and may cause aversion to Islam.
Misuse of valid instruments
Misuse of Maṣlaḥah
Maṣlaḥah as a Fiqh instrument has been overemphasized by contemporary Ijtihād in Islamic banking and finance. In some cases, it has been treated as a priority over Sharī'ah texts and Sharī'ah established rules. Upon the existence of a conflict between a Sharī'ah text (or established rule) and a mujtahid's (faqih's) perception of maṣlaḥah, the latter has been sometimes given a priority over the established Sharī'ah text or rule. This work is a departure from the legal maṣlaḥah, i.e. the maṣlaḥah that carries a legislative power in Islamic law, for a variety of reasons:
First, the claim of a possible conflict between Sharī'ah text and maṣlaḥah is an erroneous claim. If the Sharī'ah text or rule is definitive, then it cannot be in conflict with a real maṣlaḥah, because all Sharī'ah rules aim at realization of maṣlaḥah. Therefore, in this case it is the assessment of maṣlaḥah by the mujtahid which will be deemed erroneous. In other words, the issue of a potential conflict existing between a definitive Sharī'ah text and the maṣlaḥah is not conceivable if we are viewing maṣlaḥah from a Sharī'ah perspective. However, if we are viewing maṣlaḥah from a human perspective then the conflict is plausible, but the determination of what is beneficial and what is harmful cannot be left to human reasoning alone 19 . Human reasoning in that regard plays a role only within the framework guided by Sharī'ah (Nyazee 2000) . This is because, the inherent limitations of human beings posit a strong reason which requires Divine guidance to ascertain what is right and what is wrong. 20 Second, even if such a conflict hypothetically exists, then it is the Sharī'ah text that must be given priority over maṣlaḥah. This is particularly true since maṣlaḥah derives its authority from the Sharī'ah text and not vice versa. It is illogical to give priority to a branch over its core and source of authority. 21 Third, the approach of giving priority to maṣlaḥah fails to distinguish between a definitive (qat`y) and a speculative (zanniy) text. If the text is definitive with regards to its authenticity (thubut) and meaning (dalalah), then the ruling it produces is final and binding; i.e. there is no room for human perception of maṣlaḥah to add any interpretation to the text. 22 While if the text is speculative with regards to its authenticity or meaning, then there may be an avenue for the perceived maṣlaḥah to further interpret and give meaning to the text in a way that does not hinder its realization. This is acceptable as long as the perceived maṣlaḥah meets all of its conditions: being public not private, authentic not false, definitive not probable.
23
To summarize, upon presuming an occurrence of a genuine conflict between the Sharī'ah text and the maṣlaḥah, the priority must be given to the Sharī'ah text and not to the perceived maṣlaḥah, this is provided the Sharī'ah text is definitive in terms of authenticity and meaning. If, however, there is a justifiable doubt over the authenticity or the meaning of the text, then there is an avenue for the perceived maṣlaḥah to reconcile with the text.
Twisted interpretations of Sharī'ah texts & Fiqh statements
Some Interpretations of Sharī'ah texts that came in the form of Fiqh statements made by some Fiqh schools have been twisted to help legitimize certain problematic Islamic banking and finance products. For example, although sale of future debt to a third party is ruled as unlawful by all Fiqh schools based on Sharī'ah texts. Its validity has been incorrectly attributed to some Fiqh schools (like the Shafi'i school), and an unsupported distinction has been made between a debt resulting from a loan contract and a debt resulting from other financial contracts; allowing the later and forbidding the former. In fact, both the validity of sale of debt and this distinction have no ground whatsoever, and this position is based on incorrect interpretation of Sharī'ah texts and some Fiqh statement.
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Another example is 'īnah sale. Although all Fiqh schools base the permissibility of the contract on its essence and objective, rather than on its form and structure, which is the basis for the validity of the contract, cotemporary fatwas in Islamic finance have implied the opposite; considering a contract Sharī'ah compliant only if its form and structure are sound from Sharī'ah perspective. Not only do these fatwas contravene Sharī'ah texts and principles by basing contracts permissibility 22 See in Al-Ghazali, 1413H, "Al-Mustasfa", p176; Al-Bouti, 1982, "Dawabit Al-Maslah", p119. 23 Al-Bouti, 1982, "Dawabit Al-Maslah", p.119. 24 For details on this issue refer to Some Sharī'ah texts have been overlooked in fatwas on Islamic banking and finance products, although they are closely related to the fatwas in questions. For example, Sharī'ah texts very clearly state that combining between a sale contract and a loan contract in one transaction is unlawful"la yahillu salaf wa bay'" 27 (It is prohibited to combine between sale and loan), and like sale contract in this regard is any commutative contracts as elaborated by the jurists.
28 This is because the sale or the commutative contract in general could be used to cater to interest in the loan contract. For example, interest can be catered to in sale contract by demanding a price that is higher or lower than the market value, like in the lender colluding with the borrower to give him an interest-free loan but conditional on the latter buying from the former something at higher than the market value, or selling him something at lower than the market value.
However, this Sharī'ah text has been totally overlooked in a variety of products. For example, in a product named "Islamic Pawn Broking". Herein, the bank provides a so-called interest-free loan but conditional on the borrower providing valuables that will be safeguarded by the bank against fees, so that the bank can profit from the loan indirectly through the fees charged on the safekeeping of the valuables. Another product is the service-based Islamic Credit Cards, the issuing bank provides the card credit on interest-free loan basis; however, it charges the card holder for the embedded services as well as the extra services coupled with the card, like the free stuff the card holder may be entitled to when subscribing to the 25 For details on these sales see (undated), "Hashiyah", 3/76. card. This practice is basically valid, but provided the fees are against the services and not the loan. To ensure it is so, the market value of these services must not be lower than the fees charged on the card. However, in practice it is much lower, which means that the fees are meant to cater to the interest over the loan.
Blocking the means to evil
Although this instrument is vital and important for identifying the Sharī'ah compliant products and for protecting contracts from being misused and manipulated as elaborated earlier, it has not received the due attention by Sharī'ah scholars giving fatwas to Islamic banks. This is evidenced by the existence of products criticized for being genuinely no different from the conventional products, and by the misapplication of some Islamic finance products to the degree of distortion. Had this instrument been observed and applied, it would have removed these practices form the shelves of Islamic banks and filtered financing deals so that no financing would be given when resulting in unfavorable implications.
Conclusion
From the above discussion it can be concluded that Sharī'ah has equipped Muslim jurists and Scholars with useful and practical Fiqh instruments that if used properly will yield sound transactions and products. However, some of these instruments were misused, others were overlooked and some inappropriate instruments were also introduced.
These practices have been responsible for the invasion of some controversial products into Islamic finance and to the misapplication of some other products. This phenomenon has been in fact the natural result of the disorder and the lack of or weak Sharī'ah governance in Islamic banks. Despite the great importance of Ijtihād and fatwa in the field of Islamic finance and their serious implications, this area has not received the due attention. In fact, the situations call for the following urgent reforming steps:
-Ijtihād in Islamic finance must be exercised by Ijtihād institution and not by individuals at least on the products level, whereby only an independent centralized Sharī'ah committee shall have the sole authority to endorse or reject products. -The independent central Sharī'ah committee must include besides highly qualified Sharī'ah scholars economists, lawyers and financial experts, and it must have a binding authority over the individual Sharī'ah boards.
-In the absence of the Sharī'ah-committed Muslim government, a body comprising highly qualified intellectuals of different relevant specialties, similar to Shūrá council, can be formed to handle matters related to Sharī'ah policy, and it can collaborate with the central Sharī'ah committee to determine the Sharī'ah policy related to Islamic finance. -All fatwa issued by individual Sharī'ah boards or scholars must be subjected to scrutiny by the centralized Sharī'ah committee. Procedurally, the centralized Sharī'ah committee must have the authority to conduct unannounced Sharī'ah auditing visits. -A centralized qualified institution must create accreditation criteria for Sharī'ah scholars, accredit who can sit on the Sharī'ah boards of financial institutions, and exclude the Sharī'ah specialists who do not qualify for Ijtihād or fatwas.
Indeed, segregation between the Ijtihād institution and the political system has led to chaotic approaches to Ijtihād and fatwas by individual Sharī'ah scholars. This disorder did not carry much of evil before, but with the advance of Islamic banks it produced serious damages. The same disorder and confusion, however, will inevitably take place even in other fields of the Muslims' affairs when they get the chance to be applied on institutional level, because the roots of the problem are the same; mainly the rupture between the political system and the Ijtihād institution.
